Ralph Blakney v. City of Philadelphia by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-19-2014 
Ralph Blakney v. City of Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Ralph Blakney v. City of Philadelphia" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 302. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/302 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 13-3062 
____________ 
 
RALPH P. BLAKNEY, 
 
                                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;  
LINDA TURNER; LYNN SPIRO;  
JOHN DOES 1-10 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 12-cv-06300) 
District Judge:  Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 19, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Ralph Blakney appeals the order of the District Court dismissing his civil rights 
claims against the City of Philadelphia and two of its employees. We will affirm. 
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I 
 Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts of this case.  
Appellant Blakney, an African-American male, was hired by the City of Philadelphia in 
July 1988 as Director of the Older Adult Center in the City’s Parks and Recreation 
Department.  
 Almost twenty years later, Blakney filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging race discrimination.1 After receiving a right-
to-sue letter Blakney sued the City of Philadelphia, along with his supervisor, Linda 
Spiro, and the Director of Human Resources for the Parks and Recreation Department, 
Lynn Turner (collectively, “City Defendants”). See Blakney v. City of Phila., No. 10-
4237, 2011 WL 4402962 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2011) (Prior Action).  
 In January 2011, while that litigation was pending, Blakney voluntarily resigned 
from his position to care for his terminally ill mother. Consistent with the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), he provided the City with formal documentation showing 
that his mother was ill and that he assisted her. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.306. On September 
22, 2011, the District Court granted summary judgment for the City, Turner, and Spiro in 
                                                 
1 Blakney’s complaint alleged he was discriminated against when, after taking leave to 
serve as a political appointee, he was restored to his position as Older Adult Center Director 
but denied a choice between two locations. He also alleged he was denied the opportunity to 
interview for the Recreation Program Director position. 
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the Prior Action. Four days later, Blakney hand-delivered a letter to the City’s Human 
Resources Department demanding reinstatement to his prior position or to any available 
position. Although Blakney watched as the letter was faxed to Director Turner, the City 
filled the position and Blakney never received a response to his letter.  
 On October 11, 2011, Blakney filed a notice of appeal in the Prior Action. Two 
months later, he hand-delivered a second letter to the City’s Human Resources 
Department asking for a list of positions to which he could be reinstated. Again, Blakney 
watched as the letter was faxed to Director Turner, but received no response. On February 
8, 2012, Blakney filed a complaint with the EEOC, this time alleging retaliation under 
Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).2 The EEOC granted 
Blakney a right-to-sue notice and he brought suit on November 8, 2012 in the District 
Court, alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII and the PHRA. He sought relief 
against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, he sought relief against Turner and 
Spiro, whom he alleged were “the appointing authorized officials of the Parks and 
Recreation Department responsible for approving Plaintiff’s reinstatement requests,” 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The City, Turner, and Spiro filed a motion to dismiss Blakney’s 
amended complaint, which the District Court granted. Blakney timely appealed. 
 
                                                 
2 Two days later, Blakney voluntarily withdrew his appeal in the Prior Action. 
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II3 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to 
dismiss. Anspach v. City of Phila., 503 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2007). In doing so, we 
presume the complaint’s well-pleaded facts to be true and view them in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d 
Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, which, 
taken as true, state a plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
Blakney alleges unlawful retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA.4 Title VII 
prohibits employers from discriminating against “any individual . . . because he has 
opposed any . . . unlawful employment practice” under Title VII, or because he has “made 
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing” pursuant to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To establish a prima facie case 
of retaliation, plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the 
employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) there was a causal 
connection between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action. Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006). 
                                                 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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The parties agree that Blakney established the first two elements of his prima facie 
case: he engaged in protected activity under Title VII, having brought a race 
discrimination complaint against the Parks and Recreation Department, whose failure to 
rehire him constituted an adverse employment action. Accordingly, the sole question on 
appeal is whether the District Court erred when it held that Blakney failed to plead the 
third element of his prima facie retaliation case: causation.  
To satisfy the third prong, Blakney “must establish that his . . . protected activity 
was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Texas Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). We have previously held that 
“temporal proximity between the employee’s protected activity and the alleged retaliatory 
action may satisfy the causal link element of a prima facie retaliation claim, at least where 
the timing is ‘unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive.’” Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 
494, 505 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he mere fact that adverse 
employer action occurs after a complaint will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the 
plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a causal link between the two events.” Robinson v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir. 1997).  
We have found that a temporal proximity of two days is unusually suggestive of 
causation, see Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989) (reversing summary 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Because the analysis for adjudicating a retaliation claim under the PHRA is identical 
to a Title VII inquiry, we need not address Blakney’s PHRA claim separately. Goosby v. 
Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000).  
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judgment for the defendant when plaintiff was fired two days after his employer received 
notice of his EEOC complaint), but have held that a temporal proximity greater than ten 
days requires supplementary evidence of retaliatory motive, see Farrell v. Planters 
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that “where the temporal 
proximity is not so close as to be unduly suggestive,” the appropriate test is “timing plus 
other evidence”); see also Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 
(3d Cir. 2004) (two months is not unusually suggestive); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish 
Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007) (three months is not unusually 
suggestive).  
We measure temporal proximity from the date on which the litigant first files a 
complaint. See Jalil, 873 F.2d at 703. Here, Blakney filed an EEOC complaint in 2008 
and sued in federal court in 2010. He voluntarily resigned in January 2011 and first 
sought reinstatement in September 2011—four days after summary judgment was entered 
against him in the Prior Action. He sought reinstatement a second time in December 
2011. Thus, the period between the filing of the EEOC complaint and the City’s failure to 
reinstate Blakney spans three years, which falls well short of the “unduly suggestive” 
mark. See Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that protected 
activity that extended “over a substantial period of time” is “insufficient to establish 
causation”).  
Because the temporal proximity here is not sufficiently close to imply direct 
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causation, we apply the “timing plus other evidence” test to determine whether other 
pleaded facts suggest retaliatory motive. Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280. We have held that such 
“other evidence” may include, but is not limited to, a “pattern of antagonism” subjecting 
plaintiff to a “constant barrage of written and verbal warnings and . . . disciplinary 
actions, all of which occurred soon after plaintiff’s initial complaints.” Robinson v. Se. 
Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1993). Absent direct evidence of 
antagonism, circumstantial evidence may be used to support an inference of antagonism. 
For example, “a plaintiff may establish the connection by showing that the employer gave 
inconsistent reasons for terminating the employee.” Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280-81.  
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Blakney did not plead facts 
showing that he was subject to retaliatory conduct during the period between his EEOC 
claim in 2008 and his voluntary resignation in 2011. After he resigned, the only negative 
conduct Blakney experienced at the hand of the Parks and Recreation Department was 
passive at best—they ignored his reinstatement requests. Other than two trips to hand-
deliver letters demanding reinstatement, Blakney pleaded no contact with the Department 
after his resignation.  
Nevertheless, Blakney claims we should infer antagonism from the City’s response 
to his reinstatement demands, which he bases on (1) the “absolute silent treatment” he 
received upon delivering his letters, (2) the fact that City Defendants “quickly filled” his 
position after he sought reinstatement, and (3) City Defendants’ failure to reinstate him 
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when, he claims, he was entitled to reinstatement pursuant to Civil Service Regulation 
15.031. We disagree. 
The City’s decisions to ignore Blakney’s reinstatement requests and fill the 
position with another employee were neutral acts that do not create an inference of 
antagonism. Moreover, Blakney’s claim that he was entitled to reinstatement under Civil 
Service Regulation 15.031 is belied by the text of the regulation itself:  
An employee who has resigned in good standing may be reinstated within one 
year to any position in the City service in the same class, in a comparable class, 
or in a lower class in the same or comparable series of classes having 
substantially the same qualification requirements, skills or aptitudes if such 
reinstatement is approved by the Director and by the appointing authority of 
the department in which the reinstatement is to be made. 
 
Phila. Civ. Serv. Reg. 15.031 (emphasis added). Blakney seems to have misread this 
regulation, replacing “may be reinstated” with “must be reinstated.” As the District Court 
correctly noted, the language of the regulation is “intentionally discretionary in nature.” 
Blakney v. City of Phila., No. 12-6300, 2013 WL 2411409 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2013) at *6. 
Because Blakney was not entitled to reinstatement, the City’s decision not to rehire him 
does not support an inference of antagonism. 
For the reasons stated, the District Court properly found that “both the protected 
activity and the adverse employment action continued over such an extended period of 
time that it is impossible to make any inference of causation between them.” Id. at *5. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court as it relates to Blakney’s Title 
VII and PHRA claims.  
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III 
Our conclusion that the District Court did not err when it held that Blakney failed 
to plead causation dictates the same result as to his claims against Turner and Spiro under 
42 U.S.C. § 1981. The same three-prong test that applies to Title VII and PHRA claims 
also applies to § 1981 claims. Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 263. Accordingly, “where a Title VII 
and a § 1981 claim arise out of the same facts and circumstances and the Title VII claim 
fails, the § 1981 claim must fail for the same reasons.” Blakney, 2013 WL 2411409, at *7 
(internal citation omitted). Here, Blakney’s complaint incorporates by reference the same 
set of facts for his Title VII and § 1981 claims. Therefore, “our discussion of the Title VII 
claim above applies with equal force,” Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 263, and Blakney’s § 1981 
claim fails.5  
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, Blakney failed to state a plausible claim under Title VII, 
the PHRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1983. Therefore, we will affirm the order of the District 
Court. 
                                                 
 5 Blakney also seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department 
of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), claiming his rights under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 were violated due to the City’s failure “to properly train, supervise, 
discipline and control [the City Defendants] regarding [Blakney’s right] to be free from 
unlawful retaliatory actions.” Because this claim is derivative of Blakney’s untenable 
retaliation claim, it too must fail. 
 
